

Exorcising the Spectre of Illusions:

The deduction of freedom in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism

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Abstract: In this paper I situate Paul Guyer's (2009) account of the three fundamental problems which arise as a result of Kant's deduction of freedom, undertaken in section three of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics* (GMM), with reference to his understanding of the doctrine of transcendental idealism. Specifically, in this paper I argue that problems identified by Guyer emerge as a result of his reading of transcendental idealism as a first-order, metaphysical theory. Drawing on the works of Henry Allison (2004) and Paul Redding (2009), I explore the ways in which a second-order or reflexive interpretation of the doctrine of transcendental idealism opens up an interpretation of Kant's deduction of freedom in *GMM III* that stands in marked contrast to the one proposed by Guyer.

Keywords: Kant, Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, Guyer.

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1. Introduction

Despite the centrality of the concept of freedom in Kant's oeuvre, his philosophical treatment of freedom is, perhaps, the most contentious dimension of the critical system. Contentious, not only for Kant scholars, but, apparently, for Kant himself: in a recent monograph Paul Guyer identifies five core changes in Kant's stance concerning human freedom (2006, p. 213). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all five permutations; rather, I focus on the treatment of human freedom presented in Section III of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (hereafter *GMM*). More precisely, my intention is to explore Guyer's claim that the *deduction of freedom* undertaken by Kant in *GMM III* results in three particularly vitiating problems.

The operative conception of a Kantian 'deduction' within this paper is drawn from the thought of Henry Allison. Quite evocatively, Allison (2004, p. 160; 2011, p. 274) defines a Kantian deduction, functionally speaking, as the "exorcising" of a "spectre". Just what 'spectre' is being 'exorcised' in the deduction of freedom in *GMM III*, although intimated in the title, will be made clear in due course.

The problems, which, according to Guyer, undermine the argument of *GMM III*, are treated at length in the third section of this piece. Rather than attempt a direct refutation or, indeed, defence of Guyer's critique of Kant I intend, in the first and second sections of this paper, to explicate the continuities between Guyer's critical reading of *GMM III* and his interpretation of Kant's theory of transcendental idealism (hereafter TI). In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter *CPuR*) Kant (2005, p. A369) gives the following account of the doctrine of TI:

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.

My intention in exploring Guyer's reading of *GMM III* by first engaging with his reading of TI, a doctrine he considers to be a "harshly dogmatic insistence" (Guyer, 1987, p. 333) on restricting "spatial and temporal features to our representations of objects rather than to those objects as they are in themselves," (Guyer, 1987, p. 343) is to show that his critical reading of *GMM III* follows, and is inseparable from, his understanding of TI as a first-order, metaphysical theory.

Finally, in the third section of this piece I explore the ways in which an alternative, second-order, or, *meta-theoretical*, conception of TI – as found in the work of Allison and of Paul Redding – can yield a significantly different interpretation of key sections in *GMM III*. Thus, whilst not drawing any definitive conclusions regarding the correctness of one approach over the other, this paper aims to illuminate the ways in which wider debates within the field of Kantian scholarship can influence the hermeneutic reception of specific texts.

2. Guyer and the doctrine of transcendental idealism

Alongside the treatment of freedom, the doctrine of TI stands as one of the most controversial and actively debated aspects of the critical philosophy. In his monograph, *Kant and the Claims of Reason*, Guyer offers an extensive and sophisticated critique of TI. At the core of the doctrine, Guyer (1987, p. 333) identifies a fundamental hypothesis concerning

the determinate structure of reality: “space and time are the indispensable elements in all of our intuitions and judgements, yet transcendental idealism is nothing other than the thesis that things in themselves, whatever else they may be, are not spatial and temporal”. According to Guyer, TI involves the transference of spatiotemporal properties from the everyday objects we experience to our representations of them; this means that the coffee cup in front of me and the desk upon which it sits, even the self which engages with these objects, although represented and experienced as persisting in time and in the case of my desk and coffee cup, extended in space, are not *in and of themselves* spatiotemporal.

Such claims have led numerous Kant scholars to attribute to Guyer a so-called ‘two-worlds’ interpretation of TI (Allison, 2004, p. 451 n.422; Rohlf, 2010). ‘Two-worlds’ interpretations traditionally hold that TI posits the enduring existence of two “numerically distinct” (Guyer, 1987, p. 334) and ontologically discrete worlds: “one spatiotemporal and sensible, the other non-spatiotemporal but intelligible...the former is a type of construction of mental representations, whilst the latter is what Kant posits as a genuine but *unknowable* reality” (Redding, 2009, pp. 72-73). Given the outline of Guyer’s conception above, the categorisation of his as a ‘two-worlds’ interpretation seems appropriate. However, if one pushes this matter a little further, the specificity of Guyer’s interpretation becomes evident. As will be shown, the consequences of this specificity for his reading of *GMM III* are significant.

In a recently published debate with Allison and Allen Wood concerning the nature of TI, Guyer (2007, p. 12) explicitly denies ever having proposed a ‘two-world’ reading of Kant:

I have never held that Kant posits a second set of things that are ontologically distinct from ordinary things or appearances...but I have held that Kant does argue...for the claim that things – in some sense, the very same things we ordinarily talk about – do lack the very properties, namely spatiality and temporality, in terms of which all of our ordinary reference to them and discourse about them is couched.

On the basis of this clarification, which is as clear a statement of Guyer's position as one may find in the literature, Guyer concludes: "thus, I have attributed to Kant not a 'two-world' view, but an *alternative version* of a two-aspect view' [emphasis added] (ibid). Thus we can summarise Guyer's position as follows: contrary to 'two-worlds' theorists, Guyer does not posit a numerically duplicate set of objects that exists behind or beyond the everyday objects we encounter. Rather, he holds that these objects *in themselves* simply do not possess spatiotemporal properties; space and time are 'aspects' of the cognitive structure of the human mind and not 'aspects' of the world as such.

Guyer's version of the 'two-aspect' reading of Kant is indeed unique. Consider Guyer's (1987, p. 334) definition of the 'two-aspect' approach, a definition which applies, one must assume, to both his 'alternative version' and to those developed by other theorists: in presenting the doctrine of TI "Kant does not advocate an *ontological* duplication of realms of objects but a *conceptual* or *semantic* division: not two sets of objects, but two ways of thinking of or describing one and the same set of objects". This definition sits rather uneasily with his statements regarding his 'two-aspect' position; for Guyer neither proposes an '*ontological duplication*' nor a '*conceptual*' or '*semantic*' '*division*'. That which Guyer does propose is, I would argue, an *ontological disjunction*. This ontological disjunction between the properties of noumena and phenomena reoccurs in Guyer's reading of *GMM III*. Before going on to examine this in greater detail, I believe it possible to shed more light on the

idiosyncratic nature of Guyer's version of the 'two-aspect' reading. To do so I would first introduce Redding's distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' interpretations of TI.

Redding's emphasis on the tension in Kant's work between the two versions of TI emerges from his attempt to clarify the precise sense in which Kant is an idealist: "Kant was an idealist about *form*, regarding both the spatiotemporal form and the conceptual form of objects as contributed by the knowing mind (as 'mind-dependant') rather than as having independent *per se* existence" (2009, p. 2). On the issue of Kant's formal idealism Redding and Guyer concur. However, it is with regard to the *consequences* of this idealism that Guyer's 'two-aspect' reading finds its singularity. Redding (2009, p. 2) identifies two corollaries to this position regarding the 'ideality of form': "on the one hand, the thesis of the ideality of form led Kant to the idea that we can only know 'appearances', and so to a type of scepticism with respect to the project of metaphysics conceived as knowledge of 'things in themselves'". In addition to this position of metaphysical scepticism which Redding conceptualises under the rubric of 'weak TI', Redding (2009, p. 2) finds in Kant the thesis of 'strong TI' "which asserted that everything into which traditional metaphysics inquired and which it took to be ultimately real was, in some sense, mind-dependant, and did not have *per se* existence". On the 'strong' interpretation of TI metaphysical knowledge is possible because its objects, properly conceived, are objects which the mind brings forth on account of its determinate operation.

It is vitally important to note that this difference between 'weak' and 'strong' interpretations of TI is not simply determined with regards to the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Behind the idea that 'weak TI' is a position of metaphysical scepticism lies a more fundamental claim, often taken for granted, concerning the *type* of theory Kant sets out in his doctrine of TI. According to the 'weak TI' reading, *and this is certainly evidenced in*

Guyer's reading of both CPuR and GMM III, Kant intends TI as a *positive*, or, substantive *first-order* theory which purports to explain the basic structure of the world and our experience of it. In contradistinction to this conception, 'strong TI' is a variant of TI that makes *predominantly meta-theoretical, second-order, or, reflexive* claims. In Allison's 'strong' reading of TI, the latter is understood as advocating an epistemological paradigm change *from* a normatively 'theocentric' conception of knowledge to a normatively 'anthropocentric' conception. Conversely, Redding's presentation of 'strong TI' focuses on Kant's 'displacement of metaphysics' *from* the theoretical attempt to cognise the world 'as such', *to* the articulation of the normative structure of practical intersubjectivity, constituted by self-determining 'moral monads'. I revisit each of these accounts in later discussions.

By introducing Redding's typology and the subsequent contrast between TI as either a metaphysical or a meta-theoretical doctrine, we are in a position to recognise in precisely what sense Guyer's is a 'two-aspect theory'. In contrast to 'two-aspect' theorists such as Allison, whose reference to 'two-aspects' indicates a methodological approach to examining the world, Guyer's reference to 'two-aspects' indicates an ontological disjunction between *actual* features of representations and the world as it "ultimately and 'really' is" (Redding, 2009, p. 47). For Allison the 'two-aspects' *emerge* on the basis of a reflexive stance assumed by the agent, for Guyer the 'two-aspects' *pertain* to the immutable structure of objects and their representation in human cognition. Given the presence of a 'weak' interpretation of TI, it is little wonder that Guyer is so often understood as a 'two-world' theorist; however, the purpose here is not a critique of the immanent consistency of Guyer's understanding of TI. My intention is simply to bring to light the continuity between Guyer's 'weak' version of the 'two-aspect' interpretation of TI and the problems he identifies in the argument of *GMM III*.

3. The deduction of freedom in GMM III

Having foregrounded the deduction of freedom by identifying Guyer's commitment to a 'weak' 'two-aspect' interpretation of TI, we are now in a position to consider the deduction itself. Kant's task in *GMM III* is to provide a synthetic proof of the "normativity of morality", as Christine Korsgaard (1996, p. 43) has insightfully termed. With this locution Korsgaard captures what it is about the moral law that Kant sets out to prove in *GMM III*: Kant intends to articulate a proof that the moral law, subjectively represented as the categorical imperative, is both *motivating* and *binding* for human agents, further, that it is *universally* and *necessarily* so. In short, Kant intends a demonstration of the reality of moral obligation for beings such as ourselves; famously, he attempts to do so by demonstrating the possibility of autonomous human agency.

To this end Kant (2011, p. IV: 447) makes the following assertion: "*freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings*". Part of being a rational being, Kant goes on to elaborate, is relating to oneself as an autonomously self-determining being. To properly grasp this argument it is helpful to consider a parallel between the autonomous self-determination of practical reason – that is, the will – and the spontaneous character of theoretical judgements. Just as we, *qua* rational beings, do not consider our judgements about the world to be forced upon us or involuntary – for example, I, to the extent that I am a rational being, must consider myself the author of the judgement 'turbulent winds blew down my fence' - so too, part of being *the kind of being* that is capable of rational agency is relating to oneself as the author of one's own volition. As Kant (2011, p. IV: 448) states, "reason must view herself as the authoress of her principles, independently of alien influences, as must consequently, as practical reason, or the will of a rational being, by herself be viewed as free".

Thus, Kant states in an enigmatic though important proposition: “every being that cannot act otherwise than *under the idea of freedom* is actually free, in a practical respect, precisely because of that” (ibid). Kant’s claim here seems to be that considering oneself as the determinate source of one’s volition is a necessary condition for the possibility of rational agency. Yet, this transcendental argument alone cannot suffice as evidence of the *reality* of freedom; as Sally Sedgwick (2008, p. 180) remarks: “I can surely regard myself as Cleopatra without, in fact, being Cleopatra”. The important point to note here is that although human beings *qua* rational agents *cannot but* consider themselves as free in the morally relevant sense, a ‘spectre’ remains. This ‘spectre’, *the possibility that human beings are in some sense mistaken or deluded regarding the authorship of their volitions*, is that which Kant attempts to ‘exorcise’ with his deduction of freedom. In sum, the deduction of freedom is intended to justify our ‘acting under the idea’ of freedom by demonstrating that the freedom we must impute to ourselves as rational agents is not merely an *illusion*. To do so Kant makes recourse to the doctrine of TI.

Kant’s recourse to the doctrine of TI in his deduction of freedom is a subject of much debate. According to some commentators, including Sedgwick (2008, p. 193) and Allison (2011, p. 330 n. 358), Kant looks to the doctrine of TI as a means of opening up the possibility of human freedom, in much the same manner as his resolution of the Third Antimony of the Transcendental Dialectic of the *CPuR*. Guyer (2009, p. 177), in contrast, insists that Kant’s reference to TI is a preliminary move, on the basis of which, he develops a “metaphysical argument...intended to prove that the moral law is the *causal* law of the real self”. Here already, can be seen, I believe, the hermeneutic emanations of Guyer’s ‘weak’ ‘two-aspect’ conception of TI.

Kant introduces the doctrine of TI and subsequently begins his 'exorcism' of the 'spectre' of illusion with the following claims, quoted at length by virtue of their centrality in the following discussions:

It is an observation for which no subtle thinking is required...that all representations that come to us without our choosing (like those of the senses) enable us to cognise objects only as they affect us, while what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us□This must yield a distinction, however rough, of a *world of sense* from the *world of understanding*, the first of which can be very dissimilar according to the dissimilar sensibility of many kinds of observers of the world, whereas the second, which is its foundation, always remains the same. (2011, pp. IV: 450 - IV: 451).

Recall Guyer's insistence that, although, with reference to TI, we can properly speak of only one world, within that world there persists a radical ontological disjunction between the way we experience the world and the way the world is 'in itself'. This ontological disjunction, introduced into the argument of *GMM III* in the above passage, enables Kant, on Guyer's account, to establish a profound opposition between the phenomenal and noumenal selves. According to Guyer the second stage in Kant's analysis, which is contained in the following passage, completes the latter's metaphysical argument for the transcendental reality of human freedom:

Now, a human being actually does find in himself a capacity by which he is distinguished from all other things, even from himself, in so far as he is affected by objects, and that is reason...reason under the name of the ideas shows a spontaneity so pure that thereby he goes beyond anything that sensibility can ever afford him, and provides proof of its foremost occupation by distinguishing the world

of sense and the world of understanding from each other, and thereby marking out limits for the understanding itself (Kant, 2011, p. IV: 452).

This passage is absolutely crucial for understanding Guyer's critical reading of *GMM III* and is revisited in the final paragraphs of this piece. It is worthwhile, therefore, considering it in some detail.

On Guyer's reading, Kant, in the above passage, draws attention to a particularly pertinent dimension of human experience. As argued in the Transcendental Analytic of the *CPuR*, human experience is structured according to the pure concepts of the understanding. Of these categories 'Causality and Dependence' or causation, is of particular importance in the present discussion. As an *a priori* condition of all possible experience causation is a universal and necessary given of empirical existence. Yet, as the above passage indicates, in the course of their experience human agents recognise within themselves a faculty that admits of no apparent causal determination – the faculty of theoretical reason. According to Guyer (2009, pp. 185-188), that which, is problematic in this passage is Kant's apparent attribution of the faculties of sensibility and understanding to the phenomenal self whilst at the same time *positively identifying* the faculty of reason with the noumenal self. According to Guyer's reading it is precisely in taking this further, *substantively metaphysical*, argumentative step that Kant goes beyond the resolution of the Third Antimony.

Thus, for Guyer, Kant 'exorcises the spectre of illusion' by demonstrating in the strongest possible terms that despite 'appearances' to the contrary human beings are, at the deepest and most real level of their being, rational and hence *free* agents. Furthermore, in so doing, Kant, it is argued, not only instantiates a highly problematic opposition between the phenomenal and noumenal selves – that is, the ego as appearance and the 'real', 'true',

noumenal ego - but also, in the process, violates the terms of his own epistemology. The influence of Guyer's 'weak' 'two-aspect' conception of TI permeates these arguments thoroughly. In the following discussion I aim to demonstrate that an alternative, 'strong' interpretation of TI can yield a significantly different interpretation of key passages in *GMM III*, thus demonstrating that the problems identified by Guyer in the argument of *GMM III* arise as a direct consequence of his 'weak' 'two-aspect' conception of TI.

4. Problems with the deduction of freedom in GMM III

According to Guyer, three fundamental complications arise from Kant's deduction of freedom. The first relates to what might be termed 'the problem of epistemic access'. The 'problem of epistemic access' is posed by Guyer (2009, p. 178): "how could a critique of our pure practical reason possibly yield a positive, synthetic *a priori* claim about our real, noumenal selves, when the entire argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has apparently proven that we can have no metaphysical cognition of the noumenal realm at all?". The second problem, which I refer to as 'the problem of conflicting selves', finds problematic the volitional disparity that Kant seemingly establishes between the noumenal and phenomenal selves:

If, as Section III appears to argue, our noumenal self is the *ground* or *basis*...of the 'constitution' of the subject...how can there be any *tension* or *conflict* between the inclinations of the phenomenal, empirical self and the will of the real, noumenal self? (ibid).

Finally, Guyer raises the problem, first identified by Kant's contemporary Karl Leonhard Reinhold, regarding the modality of the free will's determination by the moral law. This

problem, which I call ‘Reinhold’s problem’, concerns Kant’s apparent insistence that the autonomous will is *necessarily* – as opposed to *possibly* – determined by the moral law; as Guyer (ibid) states: “if the moral law is really the causal law of our noumenal selves, and if a causal law is genuinely universal and necessary...then how can anyone ever act *contrary* to the moral law, that is, how is *immoral* action possible at all?”

These problems, one must recognise, cannot be simply reduced to Guyer’s understanding of TI. Neither, and this is the chief claim of the present paper, can they be reduced simply to fissures inherent in Kant’s argument. Guyer’s reading of *GMM III* emerges from the dynamic interplay of his theoretical commitments and his engagement with the text itself. In precise terms, the three problems outlined above are each and all dependent on Guyer’s insistence that Kant develops a metaphysical argument for the transcendental reality of human freedom. As the preceding sections of the paper have intimated, this imputation to Kant cannot be understood in isolation from Guyer’s unique interpretation of the doctrine of TI. I would like to now continue and conclude this paper by opening up the key passages and steps in Guyer’s reading to the lens of a ‘strong’ interpretation of TI. This is so I can provide an explicit alternative to the critique developed by Guyer.

The first step that requires reconsideration is Kant’s introduction of the transcendental distinction between the world of sense and the world of understanding, at IV: 450 and quoted above. Recall, that on Guyer’s account this distinction serves to ground the proposed differentiation between the heteronomously determined empirical self and the autonomously determined transcendental self. A ‘strong’ interpretation of TI, immediately recognises a different intention here: the transcendental distinction does not apply to the structure of reality, but instead, is a reflexive injunction to differentiate between the qualitatively discrete epistemic perspectives human agents can assume towards themselves and the world. As

Redding (2009, p. 72) states, 'strong TI' is a meta-theoretical position that raises the possibility of a "shift in the fundamental *stance* appropriate to objects in the world". To gain an appreciation of why Kant would introduce the doctrine of TI, so understood, into the argument of *GMM III* it is useful to come to understand the ways such a 'stance' is epistemically constituted.

As knowers, that is, as subjects who relate to the world in a theoretical manner, which is to say an explanatory and/or predictive manner, experience is structured, according to Allison, by the 'epistemic conditions' of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding. According to Allison (2004, p. 11), the notion of an 'epistemic condition' is "here understood as a necessary condition for the representation of objects, that is, a condition without which our representations would not relate to objects or, equivalently, possess objective reality". With the notion of epistemic conditions – the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding - Kant instantiates a meta-philosophical shift from what Allison terms the 'theocentric' paradigm to the 'anthropocentric' paradigm. What this paradigm change means is that a purportedly omniscient, divine intellect, should no longer be the standard, according to which, human claims to knowledge must be held: "what the subject contributes to knowledge on its own but independent of all experience...not veil the truth. On the contrary, it makes truth possible in the first place – the truth, however, of objects and states of affairs as they present themselves to us" (Höffe, 1994, p. 68) and not as they may be from some "higher, context-independent standpoint" (Allison, 2006, p. 122).

The importance of the turn to the 'anthropocentric' paradigm for the present discussion lies in the fact that it dissolves the question of whether or not human agents are in fact 'really free'. By this I mean that the problem of human freedom, therefore, cannot be addressed from the proverbial 'God's eye' perspective, it must be addressed from the *perspectives* of

human experience. As *knowers*, or, from the ‘theoretical perspective’ afforded by the ‘epistemic conditions’ of experience, the world is disclosed as, amongst other things, a universal and necessary causal matrix. Within this matrix, where each occurrence is preceded by a sufficient cause, the prospects for human freedom, and thereby morality, seem bleak. However, and this *I take to be a viable alternative to Guyer’s reading of the introduction of TI into the argument of GMM III*, the doctrine of TI reveals that this ‘theoretical perspective’ is not the sole option open to human beings. In addition to the ‘theoretical perspective’ structured by the faculties of experience, human beings have access to a stance structured by *the faculty of reason*: this stance itself is understood by Kant as encompassing both *theoretical* and *practical* moments.

To reiterate, one, by applying the insights of theorists such as Allison and Redding to the argument of *GMM III* might suggest the following reading: *pace* Guyer, Kant’s introduction of the doctrine of TI does not serve to foreground the metaphysical argument for the transcendental reality of human freedom, rather it serves to bring into question the very perspective from which the problem of human freedom is to be approached. The conclusion being that when approached from the *practically* ‘rational perspective’ – that is, the perspective that is not structured by the epistemic regime of the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding – the problem of human freedom, and the practices of human morality, appear in a new light.

This conclusion is reached by drawing on the argument in the second key passage in Guyer’s reconstruction – specifically p. IV: 452, quoted above. Accordingly, this passage might be understood, not as articulating the rational structure of the noumenal self, *as per* Guyer, but, as an argument that outlines the physiognomy of our ‘acting under the idea of freedom’ – the touchstone of rational agency. It is, according to Allison’s (2011, p. 325)

interpretation of Kant, by virtue of one's capacity to take up precisely this aforementioned *practically* 'rational perspective' that one is both capable of, and justified in, 'acting under the idea of freedom'. The experience we have of pure reason – manifest in the Ideas of reason: God, the soul and freedom – attests to the capacity of the mind to posit Ideas which have no existence in objective reality as disclosed in experience. Or in the terms of Allison's (2011, p. 326) commentary of *GMM III*: our experience of the faculty of reason justifies our conception of ourselves as "member[s] of the intelligible world". Here I would like to clarify that 'membership in the intelligible world' refers, according to the 'strong' interpretation of TI, to one's propensity for pure conceptual thought - *practical* and *theoretical* - which, by definition, exceeds the conditions of possible experience. According to a 'strong TI' reading, by grounding rational agency, and thereby morality, in one's 'membership of the intelligible world', as the relevant passage of *GMM III* is intended to do, Kant does not *expound a metaphysical theory for the transcendental reality of human freedom*, nor does he simply represent the argument previously developed under the heading "*freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings*" (Kant, 2011, p. IV: 447). By re-framing the discussion of the necessity of 'acting under the idea of freedom' in terms of the doctrine of TI, Kant articulates *a meta-philosophical theory regarding the nature of morality itself*.

Accordingly, moral norms are conceived of as emerging from a fundamentally practical, conceptually mediated, stance towards the world. When one holds oneself or another morally responsible one goes beyond the limits of experience offered by the 'epistemic conditions' of cognition. In doing so, a qualitatively novel world is disclosed; a world in which value is imposed upon fact and evaluation pervades description: a 'kingdom of ends'. As Redding (2009, p. 72) expresses it, in a particularly vital passage, human moral practice "proceeds from purely conceptual considerations and does not ultimately rest on

knowledge". The pivotal consequence of this extra-cognitive approach to moral experience is, however, that one may never *know* that one is *in fact* free. The Kantian rejoinder here, brought to light by proponents of a 'strong' interpretation of TI, is as profound as it is elegant: one need not *know* that one is free – *one attests to one's freedom, one 'exorcises the spectre of illusion', each and every time one holds oneself to the categorical imperative.*

5. Conclusion

This paper has covered much ground, the terrain has been demanding. It is scarcely possible that the themes treated could be done justice within the limits of this paper. What I aim to have illuminated is both the symmetry between Guyer's critical reading of *GMM III* and his idiosyncratic interpretation of the doctrine TI, and, to a more limited extent, I hope to have shed some light on some of the key debates facing contemporary Kant scholars. With regards to the former, it is my contention that the problems identified by Guyer in Kant's argument find their source, textual evidence notwithstanding, in Guyer's reading of *GMM III* as a metaphysical argument for the transcendental reality of human freedom. A reading, to be sure, that is inextricable from a 'weak' 'two-aspect' interpretation of the doctrine of TI.

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